TO ANOTHER . . .
You are different from me. Our lives define different cross-sections of existence that we forge respectively through the common space and time. We encounter different "samples" of reality. But let's suppose we are clones, or identical twins. Let's further suppose that in addition to the same set of genes we also share an identical background and life experience.
For all external purposes we would be identical, and thus interchangeable. But we still would be different by virtue of separate identities and independent existence. If one of us were to be thrown in jail, determining which one would make all the difference to you and me.
Thus, being different is a twofold thing: (A) and (B) are different in that they are dissimilar, while (A) and (A') are different in that they are distinct and separate, though identical.
Similarly, being the same denotes either "being continually one and the same", as opposed to being something else, or "being exactly alike", and therefore equivalent with respect to something else. (A) is THE SAME as (A), because it is simply (A), and (A) is THE SAME as (A'), because they are both identical, though distinct and existing independently.
It follows from our linguistic conventions that the condition existing between two clones is at once that of being "the same" AND of being "different".
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